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THE BUSINESS IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
COMES OF AGE
Richard Brigault
It is difficult to say precisely when the business improvement dis-
trict (BID) was born. BIDs emerged out of legal structures and con-
cepts that date back many decades, but the specific BID form is a
relatively recent development. By some accounts, the first BID in the
United States was the Downtown Development District of New Or-
leans, which was established in 1975.' Few BIDs were created before
1980, and in most places the surge in BID formation did not really
get going until around 19902-the year that Philadelphia's Center
City District was first established. Although new BIDs were created
on a regular basis around the country throughout the 1990s and
2000s, it is fair to say that 2010 marks the completion of two decades
of what I will call the BID movement -that is, the development and
spread of, and the academic and public debate about, this new
structure of urban governance. The BID combines public and pri-
vate, as well as city and neighborhood features, in novel and inter-
esting ways, and it provides a useful means of maintaining and
supporting the urban environment. Yet, as many critics have
pointed out, the BID also raises troubling issues of urban service
inequality, accountability, and the focus of urban governance.' It is
hard to imagine a better way to analyze the coming of age of the
business improvement district than through the extraordinary col-
lection of studies of Philadelphia's BIDs in this issue of the Drexel
Law Review.
These studies nicely demonstrate the success of the BID as an in-
stitutional innovation. From a tentative beginning, with one district
two decades ago, Philadelphia now has fourteen BIDs in a wide va-
riety of neighborhoods. Many of the BIDs have been renewed one or
* Richard Briffault is the Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation at Columbia Law
School.
1. See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Ur-
ban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 367 (1999).
2. Id.
3. The Center City District was initially incorporated as the Special Services District of
Central Philadelphia in 1990. It was renamed Center City District in 1992. See Goktug Morqel,
Center City District: A Case of Comprehensive Downtown BIDs, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 271, 274 (2010).
4. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 371-73,455-69.
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more times.' In Philadelphia, as in much of the country, the BID is
now a well-established and widespread phenomenon.
Yet these studies also indicate that the scope of BID activities has
changed little in two decades and continues to be limited largely to
the basics of "clean and safe," street maintenance and some street-
scape improvements, district branding, and the marketing of district
businesses.6 In other words, even as the number of BIDs has in-
creased significantly, what they do remains relatively constrained.
Although some observers in the early years of the development of
BIDs expressed the fear that BIDs were the harbinger of a broader
privatization and balkanization of urban governments, 7 these stud-
ies suggest that those fears were significantly overblown. BIDs are
interesting, but with the exception of the Center City BID, they play
a relatively small role in urban governance.
These studies also examine the complex relationship between
BIDs and other institutions, including businesses, local government,
and most importantly, community-based nonprofit organizations
like community development corporations (CDCs) and neighbor-
hood associations. They demonstrate that the BID needs to be seen
as part of a broader ecology of urban governance structures. Not
only do BIDs play a more limited role than might have been pre-
dicted a decade ago, but when seen in the context of other commu-
nity-based organizations, they seem a little less distinctive as well.
Finally, these studies have important implications for considera-
tion of the future of decentralization within large urban centers.
They underscore the benefits of having community-based organiza-
tions for the articulation of neighborhood concerns, the delivery of
basic services, and the protection of the urban environment. But,
they also show that further decentralization will require much
greater attention to inter-neighborhood resource inequalities and
governance and accountability issues.
5. The Old City District was created in 1997 and reauthorized in 2002, through 2022. Doro-
thy Ives-Dewey, Clean, Safe, and Pretty: The Emerging Planning Role of the Old City District, 3
DREXEL L. REV. 209, 217 n.71, 218 (2010). The East Passyunk BID was authorized in 2002 and
reauthorized in 2009. Jonathan B. Justice, Moving On: The East Passyunk Avenue Business Im-
provement District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 227, 227 (2010). The Center City District was initially cre-
ated as Special Services District of Central Philadelphia in 1990. Its name changed to Center
City District in 1991, it was authorized in 1994 for twenty years, and it was reauthorized in
2004, through 2025. Morqel, supra note 3, at 279. The City Avenue Services District was au-
thorized in 1998 and reauthorized in 2002, for twenty years. Christine Kelleher Palus, There Is
No Line: The City Avenue Special Services District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 287, 294-95 (2010).
6. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 394-401, 404-09.
7. See id. at 373-74.
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In this Article, I will first examine both the diverse use of the BID
form in Philadelphia and the similarity and limited nature of the
services most Philadelphia BIDs provide. I will then turn to what
these studies tell us about the relationship between BIDs and the
surrounding urban institutional environment. I will conclude with
some reflections on the implications of the Philadelphia BID experi-
ence for the decentralization of governance within big cities.
I. THE DIVERSITY AND SIMILARITY OF PHILADELPHIA'S BIDS
If the success of a new institutional form, like a plant or animal
species, can be measured by the extent of its spread and its adapta-
tion to a variety of settings, then the Philadelphia experience tells us
that the BID is surely a great success. One of the most striking fea-
tures of these studies is the incredible diversity of the neighbor-
hoods in which Philadelphia's BIDs are to be found. Although the
BID is most commonly associated with downtown office and retail
districts like Center City, Philadelphia has also created BIDs in vir-
tually every type of neighborhood - commercial,' industrial,9 aca-
demic,10 sports,n and residential.12 Some of these districts are afflu-
ent," but although BIDs were once criticized as part of the "seces-
sion of the successful,"" a significant fraction of Philadelphia's BIDs
are located in relatively poor neighborhoods." Similarly, although
8. See Jill Simone Gross, The Aramingo Avenue Shopping District: Stakeholder's Bridge or Bor-
der Divide?, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 171, 173 (2010); Justice, supra note 5, at 228; Craig M. Wheeland,
The Greater Cheltenham Avenue Business Improvement District: Fostering Business and Creating
Community Across City and Suburb, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 357, 358 (2010).
9. See Aman McLeod, The Port Richmond Industrial Development Enterprise: A Successful
Model for Preserving Urban Industry, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 253, 253 (2010).
10. See Thomas J. Vicino, New Boundaries of Urban Governance: An Analysis of Philadelphia's
University City Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 339, 339 (2010).
11. See Juliet F. Gainsborough, The Sports Complex Special Services District: Thirty Million
Dollars for Your Trouble, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 155, 155 (2010).
12. See Thomas J.B. Cole & Seth R. Grossman, The Chestnut Hill Business Improvement Dis-
trict: Learning from Other BIDs, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 125, 127-29 (2010), Fayth Ruffin, Roxborough
on the Rise: A Case of Generating Sustainable Buy-In, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 309, 310-11 (2010).
13. See Wayne Batchis, Privatized Government in a Diverse Urban Neighborhood: Mt. Airy
Business Improvement District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 109, 112 (2010); Richard M. Flanagan, Mana-
yunk Development Corporation: The Search for Sustainable Gentrification and a Parking Spot, 3
DREXEL L. REV. 139, 142 (2010); Ives-Dewey, supra note 5, at 211.
14. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 373 (citing Robert B. Reich, The Secession of the Successful,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1991, at 16).
15. See Gross, supra note 8, at 178-81; Whitney Kummerow, Finding Opportunity While
Meeting Needs: The Frankford Special Services District, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 243, 245 (2010); Robert
Stokes, The Challenges of Using BIDs in Lower Income Areas: The Case of Germantown, Philadelphia,
3 DREXEL L. REV. 325, 326 (2010); Wheeland, supra note 8, at 369.
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some of Philadelphia's BIDs have been established in predomi-
nantly white areas, some are in neighborhoods that are largely Af-
rican American17 or that mirror the racially diverse demographic
make-up of the city as a whole." And while some districts are pros-
perous and gentrifying with low crime rates,19 others are blighted,
declining, and crime-ridden.2 0 Some of Philadelphia's BIDs are
downtown,21 some are in outlying areas, 2 and two actually straddle
Philadelphia's border and combine parts of the city with other
communities. 23 Philadelphia's BIDs also take different legal forms-
including the special services district (SSD) and the neighborhood
improvement district-and are authorized under a variety of stat-
utes, including some that long predate the modern BID and others
that were enacted expressly to facilitate BID formation.2 4
The spread of BIDs suggests that there is great value in an institu-
tional form that allows neighborhoods to raise additional revenue
from property owners or businesses within the community to be
used to finance programs for and activities within the community,
rather than to depend entirely on city hall for public services. BIDs
enable communities to address neighborhood needs and to provide
themselves with additional services. More importantly, BIDs enable
community-based decisionmakers to determine exactly which sup-
plemental services will be provided and what activities undertaken.
In a large metropolis, with most service decisions typically made by
an often distant, difficult-to-reach city government, the opportunity
for a neighborhood-based determination of preferences and priori-
ties is likely to be particularly appealing.
Although the diversity of BID locations in Philadelphia is impres-
sive, equally noteworthy is the similarity of what most of these BIDs
do: street cleaning; graffiti removal and related supplemental sanita-
tion services; 25 supplemental security; 26 streetscape improvements; 27
16. See Flanagan, supra note 13, at 142; Ives-Dewey, supra note 5, at 211; Ruffin, supra note
12, at 311.
17. See Batchis, supra note 13, at 112.
18. Palus, supra note 5, at 288-89.
19. See, e.g., Ruffin, supra note 12, at 312.
20. See, e.g., Kummerow, supra note 15, at 244.
21. See, e.g., Ives-Dewey, supra note 5, at 209 (explaining the Old City District's location
within the historic district).
22. See, e.g., Cole & Grossman, supra note 12, at 125.
23. Palus, supra note 5, at 288; Wheeland, supra note 8, at 358-59.
24. See Ruffin, supra note 12, at 312-13 (discussing the four forms of BID creation and the
statutes authorizing the establishment of BIDs).
25. See, e.g., Kummerow, supra note 15, at 248-49.
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holiday lights and events; promotion of uniform signage for dis-
trict businesses; 29 marketing of district businesses and branding of
the district;0 and modest capital programs." The more ambitious
BIDs have sought to address parking, traffic, and zoning issues, 32
while the Center City BID has taken on issues of land-use planning,
transportation, social services for the homeless, and the operation of
a community court for quality of life crimes.
The overarching focus of the Philadelphia BIDs, like BIDs else-
where, is on maintaining and improving the urban public environ-
ment.34 By devoting resources and attention to such mundane mat-
ters as security, trash collection, street cleaning, graffiti removal,
banners, lights, street signs, fountains, trees, flowers, and street fur-
niture, BIDs help to make urban public spaces more open, appeal-
ing, and accessible. They are a reminder of the importance of attrac-
tive public spaces to urban life and of the need for ongoing, com-
munity-based attention to protect and promote those spaces.
The services provided by Philadelphia's BIDs are largely the same
as those undertaken by BIDs in Philadelphia and elsewhere a dec-
ade or more ago. The rapid proliferation of BIDs in the 1990s raised
concerns that BIDs would usher in a broader privatization of urban
governance and a greater fragmentation of urban service delivery.
Critics feared that more and more resources and services would be
devolved to these organizations, with city governments thereby
weakened and services for poor areas, in particular, undermined."
The Philadelphia studies indicate that these fears were groundless.
With a handful of exceptions, the activities of the BIDs largely con-
tinue to be the basics of "clean and safe," street maintenance and
improvements, and modest forms of business promotion. BIDs may
have had a real effect on the safety and physical appearance of cer-
tain areas like Center City and University City,36 but they have not
changed local governance in any significant way. Although BIDs
26. See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 13, at 119.
27. See, e.g., Ruffin, supra note 12, at 318-20.
28. See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 13, at 113.
29. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 8, at 189, 191.
30. See, e.g., Palus, supra note 5, at 296.
31. See, e.g., Vicino, supra note 10, at 351.
32. See, e.g., Palus, supra note 5, at 297-98.
33. See, e.g., Morgol, supra note 3, at 279.
34. See Briffault, supra note 1, at 394-409 (discussing services provided by, inter alia, BIDs
in New York, Baltimore, Dallas, Los Angeles, and New Jersey).
35. See id. at 455-69.
36. See Morqbl, supra note 3, at 280-81; Vicino, supra note 10, at 350-51.
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have spread widely, the fraction of local public service delivery and
government activity that they take up has remained largely constant
and relatively small. The BID model is not going to take over local
government, significantly erode the power of city hall, or displace
the role of the traditional public sector in providing most municipal
public services. The Philadelphia studies suggest that even as the
number of BIDs has multiplied, the momentum of the BID move-
ment has crested, with BIDs providing a number and level of ser-
vices that have been relatively constant for about a decade. BIDs
have settled down. They are part of the fabric of urban governance,
but they are far from transformative.
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
A business improvement district is an intriguing blend of public
and private, municipal, and neighborhood elements. A BID is cre-
ated by city government, and it is given the classic public power of
compulsory assessment-that is, it can require property owners
within the district to make payments to the district whether the
property owners want to or not.3 7 But the district is typically man-
aged by a private, nonprofit organization that is controlled by an
unelected, self-perpetuating board of directors consisting primarily
of property owners or businesses within the district, often with ex
officio membership for local legislators.3 ' The BID, in turn, provides
a mix of public and business-oriented services with the goal of im-
proving conditions for business.
These case studies indicate that the institutional environment in
which BIDs operate can be as complex as the BID itself. BIDs are
imbricated with a host of other organizations -public, private, and
nonprofit. Although local business interests are typically critical in
forming and guiding the BID, these studies underscore the key roles
of governmental and nonprofit groups in the BID world. Again and
again these studies show that BID formation, BID management, and
BID operations entail the interaction of BIDs with city and state offi-
37. See, e.g., 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 18107(b) (West 2010). The University City District is
an exception. It relies largely on voluntary contributions from the principal academic institu-
tions within the district and does not impose assessments. See Vicino, supra note 10, at 352.
38. The Sports Complex Special Services District is very unusual as it provides that four
board members be elected by district residents (renters as well as owners), while the remain-
der of the board consists of three representatives from the three sports facilities funding the
district, various city and state legislators from the district, and the city managing director, sit-
ting ex officio. Gainsborough, supra note 11, at 160.
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cials, with community and civic groups, and especially with CDCs.39
BIDs are part of a web of neighborhood political, economic, and so-
cial organizations, rather than entities operating on their own or
simply as arms of neighborhood business interests.
Despite the business improvement district name, these studies
suggest that in many, if not most of Philadelphia's districts, the im-
petus for district creation came from locally elected officials or from
community organizations.40 For example, in the East Passyunk BID,
the initiative for establishing the district came from a complex for-
mation of local organizations dominated by a state senator and the
South Philadelphia political machine." The Sports Complex SSD
was created as part of the City of Philadelphia's effort to address
neighborhood resistance to the creation of two new stadiums in
South Philadelphia.42 The Port Richmond BID was authorized
through the efforts of the Philadelphia Industrial Development Cor-
poration, a private nonprofit established by the city government to
support the revitalization of the Port Richmond area, with the sup-
port of the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce.43 As with
the Sports Complex SSD, the Port Richmond BID complemented the
city's neighborhood economic development program. In other cases,
state and local elected officials appear to have seen the BID as a
means of generating additional support for programs that would
benefit their constituents."
BIDs also often work closely with government agencies, as well as
business organizations, in developing programs and providing ser-
vices. The Center City District, for example, has collaborated with
the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) to
install a sign system for the entrances to SEPTA train stations, as
well as new route maps and information panels at bus stops. 45 Simi-
larly, although the Old City District study reports that it has only a
mixed relationship with the City of Philadelphia, it also notes that
the Old City District "communicates on a regular basis with the Po-
lice Department, with whom it contracts to provide extra patrols on
39. See, e.g., McLeod, supra note 9, at 256, 260-61.
40. See, e.g., Kummerow, supra note 15, at 246.
41. Justice, supra note 5, at 230.
42. Gainsborough, supra note 11, at 156-57, 165-66.
43. McLeod, supra note 9, at 254.
44. See, e.g., Wheeland, supra note 8, at 363-64.
45. Morga1, supra note 3, at 279-80.
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weekends," and also has "regular contact with the Streets Depart-
ment and [the] Licenses and Inspection Department."4
In addition to elected officials and the public sector, civic associa-
tions and CDCs have played a major role in forming or supporting
the formation of BIDs. These community organizations have recog-
nized that the establishment of a BID would also create a local au-
thority with the power to assess property owners, thereby providing
a more stable financial basis for community projects than the volun-
tary donations on which organizations without the assessment
power are required to rely. As the Mt. Airy Case Study explains, a
Mt. Airy CDC began a street cleaning program supported by gov-
ernment grants and voluntary contributions by area property own-
ers, but the program collapsed when governmental and voluntary
support declined.47 The Mt. Airy BID gained support when local
leaders recognized that a "mandatory program with dedicated
funding such as a BID" was necessary to finance the street mainte-
nance plan." Similarly, in Frankford, "the Frankford Group Minis-
tries Community Development Corporation (FGM CDC) accessed
city funds for contracted street sweeping of Frankford Avenue. The
FGM CDC and [City Councilman] Mariano convinced the Philadel-
phia City Council to pass a bill giving municipal assessment collec-
tion authority to a newly created entity, the FSSD [Frankford Special
Services District]."4
Once formed, BIDs continue to interact with local politicians, civic
leaders, and community organizations. Some BIDs are managed by
the CDCs that pushed for their formation.o For example, the Mana-
yunk Special Services District was sponsored by the Manayunk De-
velopment Corporation, which continues to be "responsible for its
governance and administration."s" Similarly, the Roxborough De-
velopment Corporation was the driving force behind the creation of
46. Ives-Dewey, supra note 5, at 214.
47. Batchis, supra note 13, at 114.
48. Id. (citing Hearing on Bill No. 060957, Bill No. 070006, Bill No. 070008, Bill No. 070009, Bill
No. 070010, Bill No. 070011, Bill No. 070012, and Bill No. 070013 Before the Comm. on Rules 12
(Phila, Pa. Mar. 14, 2007) (statement of Ken Weinstein, Co-chair, Mt. Airy BID Steering
Comm.)).
49. Kummerow, supra note 15, at 246.
50. See, e.g., id. at 248-49 (explaining that the Frankford Group Ministries CDC, which was
instrumental in the creation of the Frankford Special Services District, also managed it for
some time).
51. Flanagan, supra note 13, at 140.
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the Roxborough Neighborhood Improvement District, which was
then chosen to manage the district.5 2
In some cases, BIDs work with a CDC or other community group
in the delivery of BID services. For the East Passyunk Avenue BID,
this operated as a subsidy to the BID.s" The East Passyunk Avenue
BID worked closely with Senator Vincent J. Fumo's Citizens Alli-
ance, which in turn was the beneficiary of grants from other public
and private entities.5 4 Citizens Alliance "provided personnel and fa-
cilities for street cleaning and hanging holiday lights along the East
Passyunk strip," thereby supplementing the BID's assessments with
significant in-kind assistance." The flow of benefits may also run in
the other direction, as BID assessments are used to purchase services
or rent office space from a CDC. This became controversial in Rox-
borough, where the overlap of the BID's and CDC's boards led to
charges of conflict of interest." As the Roxborough Case Study
points out, the blurring of BIDs and CDCs is not unusual and raises
questions about the transparency of BID finances and the account-
ability of BIDs to their assessment payers."
The relationship between a BID and a CDC, or other community
groups, can be a source of strength by rooting the BID in the com-
munity's social or political infrastructure. It can also be a source of
tension when the BID's institutional interests come into conflict with
those of other groups. The Frankford Case Study, for example, re-
ports on an interesting conflict between the CDC, which played a
large part in creating the BID and encouraging the city government
to grant the BID municipal authority to collect assessments, and the
BID when the BID sought to impose liens on property owners who
failed to pay their assessments." Those delinquent assessments
eroded the BID's revenues and undermined its ability to deliver ser-
vices, but the CDC opposed the imposition of liens "because of its
need for a broader base of community support in terms of certain
housing and social service objectives . . . ."" Although they had
many shared interests, the two Frankford organizations had differ-
ent institutional needs and goals. The conflict over the imposition of
52. Ruffin, supra note 12, at 313.
53. Justice, supra note 5, at 230, 234.
54. Id. at 234.
55. Id.
56. Ruffin, supra note 12, at 317.
57. Id. at 317-18, 321-22.




liens for unpaid BID assessments led them to redefine their
relationship.
BIDs do not function in isolation. Rather, they are part of a dense
ecology of public, private, and hybrid organizations that work to-
gether, share managements and finances, and support one another,
while also competing or conflicting with each other. In a sense, these
studies tamp down the sense of BIDs as unique organizations, and
instead demonstrate that BIDs operate in a community or neighbor-
hood environment where both hybrid public-private entities and
complex inter-organizational relationships are the norm. This does
not reduce the importance of the study of BIDs; rather, it highlights
the need for examining neighborhood governance structures and
the interactions of BIDs and similar organizations, both with each
other and with the municipal public sector government more
broadly.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILADELPHIA BID EXPERIENCE FOR
THE DECENTRALIZATION OF URBAN GOVERNANCE
The Philadelphia BID experience demonstrates the possibilities
for, the benefits of, and the difficulties besetting the decentralization
of governance in major cities. The Philadelphia BIDs show that de-
centralization can happen. In fifteen neighborhoods, community-
based organizations are raising funds; providing street cleaning, sa-
nitation, and public safety services; improving streetscapes; making
capital improvements; and, in some cases, addressing such basic is-
sues as traffic flow, urban design, zoning, and land-use planning.
These organizations have provided an outlet for local initiatives and
have enabled local decision-makers to tailor their programs to local
preferences, priorities, and needs. The rapid spread and ongoing
creation of BIDs demonstrates a continuing demand for neighbor-
hood-based organizations that can improve and maintain the local
urban environment. On the other hand, the BID experience illus-
trates some of the difficulties with decentralization.
A. Resource Inequality
First, and perhaps most important, is the problem of resource ine-
quality. The essence of the BID model is community self-funding
through assessments imposed on property or businesses within the
district. The fact that the revenues are raised within the district en-
ables it to act on its own and provides the justification for using
28 [Vol. 3:19
THE BID COMES OF AGE
those revenues for district-specific projects. Yet, the studies demon-
strate that such district-based self-funding does not work for low-
income communities and, ultimately, may not even explain the suc-
cesses of more affluent districts.
Although poor communities, like affluent ones, form BIDs, the
"poor" BIDs raise and spend little money and undertake few activi-
ties. The Frankford SSD had an assessment levy of just $80,000, but
due to widespread nonpayment of assessments, collected only
$52,000 of that.60 The Germantown BID had an assessment levy of
$84,000 but, due to delinquencies, collected only $29,000," and its
"current operations are hamstrung due to an insufficient tax base." 62
By contrast, the Center City District's 2009 revenues were $18.8 mil-
lion,6' and the University City District's 2009 budget was $9.5 mil-
lion.64 Funded by a commitment of $1 million a year for thirty years
from the three sports arenas in the district, the Sports Complex SSD,
with just 9000 residents, funds a program that goes beyond cleaning
to include tree planting, funding for youth athletic activities, sup-
port for school projects, and assistance to other community and cha-
65ritable organizations.
Moreover, in a classic instance of the rich getting richer, some of
the most affluent districts are not supported primarily by their as-
sessments at all, but either benefit from other assets - Manayunk re-
ceives $281,000 in fees from municipal parking lots that it con-
trols66 -or are able to use their assessments and the successful pro-
grams that those assessments have funded to leverage other funds,
including grants from government entities, foundations, and other
private, nonprofit organizations. Thus, for the Center City District,
outside grants exceed in-district assessments.6 ' Due in part to its
parking lot revenues, property assessments accounted for only
about 20% of Manayunk's budget.6 ' Even Mt. Airy obtained 22% of
its revenues from grants and institutional contributions. 69 With suc-
cess breeding success, beginning with a large revenue base can en-
60. See id. at 245.
61. Stokes, supra note 15, at 332.
62. Id. at 335.
63. Morgl, supra note 3, at 271.
64. Vicino, supra note 10, at 343.
65. Gainsborough, supra note 11, at 164-65.
66. Flanagan, supra note 13, at 140, 147-48.
67. Morgol, supra note 3, at 284.
68. Flanagan, supra note 13, at 147-48.
69. Batchis, supra note 13, at 121.
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able a district to obtain considerable outside funding. Poorer dis-
tricts are unable to comparably leverage their more limited re-
sources.
Decentralization based on self-funding of community services and
programs can work for some communities, but not for other, poorer
communities. Yet, it is precisely those poorer communities that will
have the greatest need for the supplemental services that commu-
nity organizations can provide. The self-help model of community
organization is an attractive one, as it provides an incentive for local
participation, a justification for local control over local resources,
and a measure of independence from city hall. But it is a model that
is useful for only a limited number of communities. As the Philadel-
phia BID case studies inform us, the BID model of decentralization
is dependent on highly variable community resources and, thus,
will almost surely produce substantial service inequalities. To be
sure, decentralized service-delivery decisions can be accomplished
without decentralized funding. But that is more difficult to sustain
politically and will be more vulnerable to city government interfer-
ence. The dilemma of how to provide secure funding for a decen-
tralized decision-maker without contributing to fiscal and service
inequality has yet to be resolved.
B. Accountability and Democracy
Second, the Philadelphia BID case studies raise important ques-
tions about accountability and representation in decentralized gov-
ernance structures. A repeated theme in the case studies is the un-
certainty concerning who the stakeholders or constituents are within
the BID, who selects the BID's management, and to whom the BID is
accountable. Although these districts are styled business improvement
districts, all have substantial numbers of residents, and some are
primarily residential.' Are the residents the constituents or stake-
holders of the districts? With the exception of some of the represen-
tatives on the Sports Complex SSD and the state and local govern-
ment officials who serve ex officio on some BID boards, none of the
BID directors is elected by the local community. What about the
property owners or businesses that pay the BID assessments? Are
they the BID's constituency? Some of the BIDs guarantee representa-
tion to their largest landowners or assessment payers, 71 or to certain
70. See, e.g., Ruffin, supra note 12, at 311.
71. See, e.g., Gainsborough, supra note 11, at 161.
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civic, business, or community organizations within the BID -
although the boards of those organizations are presumably not po-
pularly elected. But there will be landowners who pay BID assess-
ments who are neither guaranteed seats nor-unlike the sharehold-
ers in a corporation -guaranteed a vote in selecting the managing
board. The model for BID management is the nonprofit organization
with a self-perpetuating board; but unlike other nonprofits, BIDs
have compulsory assessment authority. So, too, unlike most non-
profits, BIDs provide public services, and the most successful BIDs
are engaged in aspects of the governmental function of land-use
planning.
Some studies focused on allegations concerning the undue influ-
ence of a local political machine" or of a BID that contracted to buy
services from the very CDC that also manages the BID.' But beyond
the specific question of the potential conflict of interest in those
situations, virtually all BIDs present questions of representation and
accountability. BIDs have not resolved whether a BID is to serve the
community as a whole, the assessment payers, or in the many BIDs
where a handful of property owners or businesses provide the lion's
share of the revenues, the principal funders. Nor has the mechanism
for determining how these interests are to be represented and how
board members are to be held accountable to their constituents been
determined. Given that board members are not elected, it is tempt-
ing to refer to this situation as a democracy deficit, but the dilemma
is, if anything, deeper, since it is not clear whether BIDs- with their
business improvement focus and their assessment-based financ-
ing -are supposed to be democratically based at all.
To be sure, a certain amount of flexibility in BID governance
structures may be desirable. As these case studies indicate, the term
"BID" covers a lot of institutional ground. The University City Dis-
trict, for example, relies on voluntary contributions from major aca-
demic institutions rather than compulsory assessment. Likewise, the
Sports Complex Special Services District is funded by commitments
from neighborhood sports arenas as part of the process of negotiat-
ing public approval of these arenas. These unusual entities can jus-
tify idiosyncratic governance structures. For the more typical BID,
which relies on a district property assessment to justify district pub-
72. See, e.g., Cole & Grossman, supra note 12, at 129.
73. See generally, Justice, supra note 5, at 234, 238-40 (discussing the East Passyunk BID in
the wake of State Senator Fumo's conviction on corruption charges).
74. See Ruffin, supra note 12, at 313, 321.
2010] 3 1
DREXEL LAW RE VIEW
lic services, the nature of the relationship among district residents,
assessment payers, and managing boards may need a more consis-
tent and principled resolution. That resolution may not have to sat-
isfy the rules of one-person, one-vote democracy,' but it will have
to provide representation of, and accountability to, a district's con-
stituents -whoever they are determined to be.
As with financing and interdistrict inequality, until these internal
district-representation and accountability issues are addressed and
resolved, the BID's capacity to be a model for a broader decentrali-
zation of urban governance is necessarily limited. And again, as
with the financing inequality issue, resolution of these questions of
neighborhood- or community-level representation and accountabil-
ity is likely to be a necessary prerequisite for any significant decen-
tralization of urban governance.
IV. CONCLUSION
I have titled this Article The Business Improvement District Comes of
Age. While I initially intended to get at the idea that BIDs have now
been around for more than two decades, I also hoped to suggest that
the novelty of the BID has worn off, that BIDs have settled into a
regular pattern of activities, and that they have become an estab-
lished part of the urban fabric. But now that BIDs have matured
from new kids on the block into urban "adults," it is time for law-
makers to seriously address the "adult" issues of interdistrict ine-
quality and internal BID governance.
With respect to inequality, that response could involve either ac-
ceptance of the inequalities in neighborhood resources and the at-
tendant recognition that BIDs are really only going to be useful in
high-tax-base areas, or the direction of outside funding to a BID,
perhaps through some kind of matching system whereby poorer
BIDs with low per-capita tax bases get some municipal funds to
match the assessments raised without the district. With the latter
system, the extent of community support for the BID, taking into ac-
count the limited scope of its resources, could be a factor in deter-
mining the extent of municipal aid.
The issues of representation and accountability may be even more
difficult. BIDs are simultaneously business associations, not-for-
profit community organizations, and public institutions wielding
public powers. But each of these strands in the BID's DNA is associ-
75. See, e.g., Kessler v. Grand Cent. Dist. Mgmt. Ass'n, Inc., 158 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1998).
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ated with distinctly different notions of constituency and of ac-
countability to that constituency. Given the reliance on property
owners to create and sustain the BID, it is highly unlikely that BIDs
will ever be run according to the traditional democratic norm of a
board elected by district residents. A greater attention to democratic
values and concerns, however, even with respect to providing for
representation of property owners within the district, would be de-
sirable to assure the accountability of the BID to its assessment pay-
ers and the legitimacy of the BID's decisions in providing public
services to, and shaping the urban environment within, its
community.

